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LABOR LAW: GENERAL ELECTRIC'S "OVERALL'
APPROACH" TO BARGAINING HELD A VIOLATION
OF GOOD FAITH
IN 19471 a new vice president at General Electric, Lemuel R. Boul-
ware, introduced an approach to employee and union relations
designed to bolster GE's image as a reliable steward of its employees'
interests. 2  The legal propriety of this bargaining philosophy as
reflected in the conduct of the company was repudiated in General
Elec. Co.,3 where the NLRB held that GE's implementation of Boul-
wareism violated the company's duty to bargain in good faith as
required by sections 8 (a) (5)4 and 8 (d)5 of the Taft-Hartley Act.
Boulwareism is a comprehensive approach to collective bargain-
ing." By means of intensive year-round research, GE attempts to
determine what is "right" for its employees in light of business con-
ditions, competition, economic trends, and employee attitudes.7 On
the basis of facts derived from its own sources and from initial bar-
1 Prior to 1947, the employer suffered a series of setbacks in its negotiations with the
several unions representing its employees. These were the impetus for the new ap-
proach. See Northrup, The Case For Boulwarism, Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept.-Oct. 1963,
p. 87; Note, "Boulwareism": Legality and Effect, 76 HARv. L REv. 807 (1963).
2 See Note, 76 HARv. L. RaV. 807 (1963). The basic approach was to please people
with their jobs as the company pleased people with its products. Boulware stated that
if the "misunderstanding and disapproval" of the company by the public and its
workers was to end, "General Electric management must set out with a firm resolve,
first to begin to do whatever was necessary to achieve ultimately the same success in
job marketing that we had accomplished in product marketing. In other words, we
wanted good job customers and satisfied job customers." Northrup, supra note I, at
87 (quoting from a GE Employee Relations News Letter). See generally authorities
cited note I supra.
'150 N.L.R.B. No. 36, 1964 CCII NLRB 13,651, p. 22030.
'"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees ......
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8 (a) (5), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 158 (a) (5), amending National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 8 (5), 49
Stat. 452 (1935).
r"For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to [appropriate subjects of
negotiation] ... but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a pro-
posal or require the making of a concession . 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §
158 (d) (1958). (Emphasis added.)
0 See 1964 CCH NLRB at 22033.
7 Employee attitudes are determined "through independent employee attitude sur-
veys, comments made by employees at informative meetings, direct discussions by super-
visors with employees and statements in union publications." Ibid.
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gaining sessions with the unions, the company presents a "firm, fair
offer" to all unions" which, inter alia, complies with those union
demands and proposals it has found to be warranted. Although
nothing is reserved for subsequent trading or compromise, 10 osten-
sibly the offer is not made on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis, for the
company professes a willingness to alter its proposals whenever suffi-
cient new "information" is presented to indicate that its initial offer
was not "right."'1  GE's commitment to Boulwareism is strength-
ened by a policy that no strike, threat of strike, or other economic
pressure will cause the company to alter its proposal to an extent
deemed "incorrect."'12 The GE offer is at all times communicated
directly to employees through an elaborate communications system. 18
The present case arose out of the 1960 negotiations to conclude a
national contract between GE and the International Union of Elec-
trical, Radio, and Machine Workers (IUE). An impasse in negotia-
tions resulted in an unsuccessful three-week strike after which the
union capitulated and accepted GE's pre-strike offer.1 4 A majority
of the NLRB found that GE had violated sections 8 (a) (5) and
8 (a) (l)'1 of the Taft-Hartley Act by refusing to bargain in good
faith. The following actions were cited by the Board as evidence of
this refusal: (1) a failure to furnish certain information when re-
quested by the union during negotiations; (2) attempts, while en-
gaged in national negotiations with the union, to deal separately
with locals on matters which were properly the subject of national
negotiations, and solicitation of certain locals to abandon or refrain
from supporting the strike; (3) GE's presentation of its personal
accident insurance proposal to the union on a "take it or leave it"
a GE presents the identical offer to all of the unions with which it deals and also
to its non-represented employees. Id. at 22034.
9 "General Electric believes that this approach, by ending 'haggling,' puts negotia-
tions on a more factual and less emotional basis." Northrup, supra note 1, at 88.
10 1964 CGH NLRB at 22034.
11 "It is difficult to determine what type of new information will make GE change
its offer since such alterations are infrequent, but apparently such information is
limited to facts which can be ascertained objectively, as by mathematical computa-
"tions." Note, 76 HARv. L. Rav. 807, 808 (1963).
12 1964 CCH NLRB at 22034.
1 8 Ibid. Although the avowed purpose of the communications program is to educate
employees, this information is presented in a light most favorable to the company and
also criticizes union leadership. Note, 76 HARv. L. REV. 807, 808-09 (1963).
21,1964 CCH NLRB at 22032.
S5 "[It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer] to interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights [to organize and bargain
collectively] guaranted in section 7 ...... 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (1)
(1958).
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basis; and (4) GE's overall approach to and conduct of collective
bargaining.' 6
As a corollary of the duty to recognize bargaining representatives,
the federal labor law imposes a duty upon both labor 17 and manage-
ment to bargain in good faith.'8 As a general rule, the "good faith"
of an employer is determined from the facts and circumstances of
each particular case.' 9 Nevertheless, certain types of specific conduct
have been recognized as objective manifestations of a lack of good
faith bargaining. 20 It is well settled that an employer violates section
8 (a) (5) by failing to disclose relevant information to support his
contention of economic inability to meet union demands.2' In the
absence of a justifiable reason why the information should not be
furnished,2 it must be submitted to the other party within a reason-
able time.23  It is equally familiar learning that an employer violates
6 1964 CCH NLRB at 22066.
17Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8 (b) (3), 61 Stat. 141
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (3) (1958).
"'E.g., NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488 (1960).
19 NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153 (1956); NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins.
Co., 343 U.S. 395, 409 (1952); Majure v. NLRB, 198 F.2d 735, 739 (5th Cir. 1952);
NLRB v. George P. Pilling & Son Co., 119 F.2d 32, 37 (3d Cir. 1941); Southern Saddlery
Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1206 (1950); see Note, Good Faith at the Bargaining Table, 32
TEbiP. L.Q. 100, 104 (1958).
20 See generally Benetar, The Boundaries of the Duty to Bargain in Good Faith
Under the N.L.R.A., 15 BAYLOR L. Rav. 127 (1963); Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good
Faith, 71 HARv. L. Rav. 1401 (1958); Feldesman, The Supreme Court and Collective
Bargaining Under the National Labor Relations Act, 13 LAB. L.J. 339 (1962).
21 See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1956). In NLRB v. Fitz-
gerald Mills Corp., 313 F.2d 260, 265 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 834 (1963), the
court said the union is entitled to a presumption that requested wage data is relevant.
In determining relevance, the Board and the courts have distinguished between wage
data and financial data. Wage data is defined in SmrrH & MERRIFIELD, LABOR RELA-
TioNs LAW 772 (rev. ed. 1960). As a general rule, the employer must produce all
wage data requested unless he can show the request is mere harassment or goes
beyond the needs of the bargaining agent in performing its duties. Ibid. See NLRB
v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 680, 683-84 (2d Cir. 1952). See generally Benetar, supra
note 20, at 136.
-- Depending on the facts of each particular case, not every refusal to meet a union
demand will require disclosure of information. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., supra note
21, at 153-54.
The record in the present case did not indicate that the requested information
was irrelevant, 1964 CCI NLRB at 22041, or that production of such information
would have imposed an undue burden on the company. Id. at 22042.
'" In the instant case the Board found substantial evidence to show that timely
diligence bad not been exercised by GE in furnishing information concerning the cost
of various insurance and pension proposals, the number and categories of laid-off and
recalled employees in each of several specified units, and the number of employees in
each of such units with between 20-25 years of continuous service with the company.
Id. at 22039-43. The union claimed the information was necessary to enable it to
appraise the cost of the company's proposals and to determine the number of people
who would actually receive benefits from them. Id. at 22039.
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section 8 (a) (5) when he bypasses the union national bargaining
committee and attempts to deal directly with locals.24 Moreover, the
courts have consistently held that a negotiator who enters sessions
with a "take it or leave it" attitude violates section 8 (a) (5) although
ostensibly he may go through the form of bargaining.2 Addition-
ally, the following evidence a violation: meeting and conferring with
absolutely no intention of ever reaching an agreement;2 6 direct deal-
ing with employees concerning all or any matters appropriate for
collective bargaining with the union; 27 and extending a unilateral
offer to employees concerning a proper subject of collective bargain-
ing before a bona fide impasse has been reached.28  In the instant
2ADealing directly with locals in disregard of the national bargaining committee
may constitute unlawful solicitation of employees. Most cases have dealt with the
analogous situation of the employer's dealing with individual employees instead of the
union. See NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1960); Quaker State
Oil Ref. Corp. v. NLRB, 270 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1959); Federal Dairy Co., 130 N.L.R.B.
1158 (1961), enforced, 297 F.2d 487 (Ist Cir. 1962); Crater Lake Mach. Co., 131 N.L.R.B.
1106 (1961). See also Medo Photo Supply Corp. v N.LRB, 321 U.S. 678, 684 (1944).
It was alleged that GE had offered strike-truce proposals to locals which were
much more favorable than those offered to the IUE during national negotiations.
1964 CCH NLRB at 22044. However, GE argued that the locals involved were the
certified bargaining agents at the particular plants, and thus it was at liberty to deal
freely with these locals. Id. at 22045. The NLRB rejected this contention because it
found that the history of bargaining at these plants showed that the IUE national
committee was to have exclusive bargaining authority during national negotiations.
Ibid. Thus the Board found that the action of GE was directed at undermining the
IUE's position in violation of § 8 (a) (5). See The Texas Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1358, 1360-61
(1951), rev'd on other grounds, 198 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1952); Samuel Bingham's Sons
Mfg. Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 1612, 1613 (1948). See also J. I. Case Co. v. N.L.R.B., 321
U.S. 332 (1944); Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Cox, supra
note 20, at 1408; Sigal, The Evolving Duty To Bargain, 52 GEo. L.J. 379, 385 (1964).25NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 861 U.S. 477, 487 (1960); Rapid Roller
Co. v. NLRB, 126 F.2d 452, 459-60 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 650 (1942).
20 NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960); NLRB v. American
Nat'1 Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952); Vanderbilt Prod., Inc. v. NLRB, 297 F.2d 833 (2d
Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 846
U.S. 887 (1953); NLRB v. Israel Putnam Mills, Inc., 197 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1952); NLRB
v. Tower Hosiery Mills, Inc., 180 F.2d 701 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 811 (1950);
NLRB v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 120 F.2d 1004 (3d Cir. 1941); Radiator Specialty
Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 350 (1963), modified, 336 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1964); California Girl,
Inc., 129 N.L.R.B. 209 (1960).
27J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944); Medo Photo Supply Corp., v. NLRB,
821 U.S. 678 (1944); Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp. v. NLRB, 270 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1959);
NLRB v. Century Cement Mfg. Co., 208 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1953); Ingalls Shipbuilding
Corp., 143 N.L.R.B. 712 (1963); Samuel Bingham's Sons Mfg. Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 1612
(1948). Compare NLRB v. Penokee Veneer Co., 168 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1948); The
Texas Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1358, 1360 (1951), rev'd on other grounds, 198 F.2d 540 (9th
Cir. 1952).
"'See NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217 (1949); May Dept.
Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376 (1945); Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732
(D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951).
Other forms of conduct may evidence a refusal to bargain in good faith: see, e.g.,
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case, the NLRB made findings ample to sustain a decision based upon
any one of these familiar examples.
The significance of General Elec. Co., however, was the Board's
holding that even without the aforementioned factors, GE's overall
approach to and conduct of collective bargaining was sufficient to
constitute a refusal to bargain in good faith.29 It found that GE's
communications campaign and "its conduct at the bargaining table"
evidenced a "take-it-or-leave-it" attitude.30 The censure of Boul-
wareism was not predicated upon an assessment of the employer's
specific techniques of bargaining'l but rather upon a review of the
totality of conduct during the course of the negotiations.32 It would
appear from the implications of the majority33 and the observations
of the concurring opinion 4 that the Board considers the traditional
"ask-and-bid" technique essential to a good faith approach to collec-
tive bargaining.35 Although the Board expressly disclaimed any
Fiberboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (meeting and con-
ferring but a refusal to negotiate concerning a mandatory subject of bargaining);
NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962) (a flat refusal to meet and confer with the
union); NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1957) (insistence to the point of
impasse concerning a non-mandatory subject of bargaining); H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB,
311 U.S. 514 (1940) (refusal to commit to writing what has been voluntarily agreed
upon); Insulating Fabricators, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. 1325 (1963), enforced, 338 F.2d 1002
(4th Cir. 1964) (employer's failure to provide a bargaining representative who can
meet at reasonable times).
20 1964 CCH NLRB at 22066. This is not the first case in which the Board has said
that bad faith may be found even though there is no contemporaneous unlawful con-
duct. See George Groh & Sons, 141 N.L.R.B. 931, 939-40 (1963), enforced, 329 F.2d 265
(10th Cir. 1964); Snow v. NLRB, 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961), enforced, 308 F.2d 687, 693
(9th Cir. 1962).
'0 1964 CCH NLRB at 22066-67.
31 Id. at 22068. Thus, the Board stated that GE would not be required to cease
its fact-finding procedure or "specific methods of formulating proposals." Ibid.
'2 Ibid.
3 "This 'bargaining approach' [of GE] undoubtedly eliminates the 'ask-and-bid' or
'auction' form of bargaining, but in the process devitalizes negotiations and collective
bargaining and robs them of their commonly accepted meaning. 'Collective bargaining'
as thus practiced is tantamount to mere formality and serves to transform the role of
the statutory representative from a joint participant in the bargaining process to that
of an advisor." Ibid.
"The term 'bargain collectively' as used in the Act 'has been considered to absorb
and give statutory approval to the philosophy of bargaining as worked out in the labor
movement in the United States.'" Id. at 22067 n.16.
" "In effect I read the majority opinion to hold that the Act so regulates a party's
choice of techniques in collective bargaining as to make unlawful an advance decision,
concerning the position from which a party is unwilling to retreat." Id. at 22069.
The majority of the Board answered that the concurring member "misread" its
holding in asserting that its decision was based on GE's technique of bargaining rather
than on an assessment of its overall conduct. Id. at 22068.
35 Since the employer's communications campaign was probably sufficient to sustain
the finding of a refusal to bargain in good faith, see notes 24, 27-28 supra and accom-
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
intention to freeze methods of collective bargaining into an inflexible
mold,8 arguably it has done just that. The majority opinion places
so high a premium on give and take in negotiations that it seemingly
declares initial candor inconsistent with good faith bargaining; con-
sequently, this decision may compel employers and unions to waste
time and money in needless preliminary bickering before they feel
free to state their positions clearly.3 7
Nevertheless, both labor and management might prefer a state-
ment at the start of negotiations of the maximum which each side
will compromise, and yet maintain a bona fide desire to negotiate
and reach an agreement.38 To characterize such an approach to
bargaining as "take-it-or-leave-it" would be contrary to the Supreme
Court's definition of that phrase.3 9 At the very least, the Board
should clarify its decision to furnish employers with a standard by
which to appraise their future conduct.40
panying text, the only purpose served in finding a "take-it-or-leave-it" attitude was to
enable the Board to proscribe the "firm, fair offer."
Be 1964 CCH NLRB at 22067.
7See Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 720 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 57
L.R.R.M. 2307 (1964). In that case, after eleven negotiation sessions, the company took
a firm position and would not budge from it. The Board and court found no violation
of § 8 (a) (5). "As the Board pointed out, July 28 was the eleventh meeting between
the parties and the Company was entitled to take a definite position at that time." Id.
at 725. It must be pointed out, however, that the Board in the Carey case limited
it to its facts. It expressly denied that it was passing on any technique of bargaining,
such as Boulwareism in general. Philip Carey Mfg. Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 1103, 1104 n.2
(1963).
Compare NLRB v. American Natl Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952) where it is stated
that "the Act does not encourage a party to engage in fruitless marathon discussions at
the expense of frank statement and support of his position." Id. at 404.
" Thus, query whether the Board would endorse the definition of "lawful" hard
bargaining suggested by the General Counsel of the IUE? "Lawful hard bargaining
occurs, we submit, when an employer or a union refuses to change its position after
it (1) meets and confers at reasonable times and demonstrates a willingness to enter
into an agreement, (2) submits its proposals to the give and take of searching discus.
sion, (3) freely states its reasons for the positions it takes, (4) discloses any relevant
information necessary to support or evaluate its positions, and (5) states and discusses
reasons as well as information relevant to its rejection of the proposals on the other
side." Sigal, supra note 24, at 388.
8" See note 25 supra. "Collective bargaining, then, is not simply an occasion for
-purely formal meetings between management and labor, while each maintains an atti-
tude of 'take it or leave it'; it presupposes a desire to reach ultimate agreement, to
enter into a collctive bargaining contract." NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361
U.S. 477, 485 (1960).
40 The clear existence of alternative grounds for the Board's decision, see text at
notes 21-28 supra, would appear to render the somewhat confusing condemnation of
GE's overall approach to bargaining dictum. "The fundamental issues in this case
have been obscured by slogans and shibboleths which have understandably led my
colleagues into deciding issues which in my judgment are not presented for decision."
1964 CCH NLRB at 22068 (concurring opinion).
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One such standard was suggested in passing by the Board. If,
from an examination of the overall conduct of the employer, it
appears that the company has set itself up as a quasi-administrative
body having the responsibility for determining, rather than pro-
posing, wages and other working conditions for its employees and
other working conditions for its employees and has relegated the
union to a position as spokesman for an "interested group," then
this would be a strong indication of the employer's disregard of its
duty to engage in collective bargaining.41 If the company operates
in this manner, no other specific violation or occurrence of contem-
poraneous unlawful conduct would be required to sustain a finding
of a violation of section 8 (a) (5).
t. c.c.
41 "[W]hile the Board cannot force an employer to make a 'concession' on any
specific issue or to adopt any particular position, the employer is obliged to make some
reasonable effort in some direction to compose his differences with the union .... "
NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134-35 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 887 (1953); see NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1960); NLR.B
v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 680, 683 (2d Cir. 1952); Rapid Roller Co. v. NLRB, 126
F.2d 452, 459-60 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 317 U.S. 650 (1942); NLRB v. Westinghouse Air
Brake Co., 120 F.2d 1004, 1006 (3d Cir. 1941); Radiator Specialty Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 350,
368 (1963); modified, 336 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1964); Cox, supra note 20, at 1412; Note,
"Boulwareism": Legality and Effect, 76 HARV. L. REv. 807, 812-13 (1963); Comment,
Good Faith at the Bargaining Table, 32 TEMP. L.Q. 100, 103 (1958). Thus, it is
submitted that the "firm, fair offer" alone was not indicative of a refusal to bargain
in good faith, but in the instant case it was GE's absolute refusal to permit the union
to play an active role in adjusting differences between labor and management which
constituted a violation of § 8 (a) (5).
